It is quite normal for us to produce one or two million word tokens every year. Speaking is a dear occupation and producing words is at the core of it. Still, producing even a single word is a highly complex aOE air. Recently, Levelt, Roelofs, and Meyer (1999) reviewed their theory of lexical access in speech production, which dissects the word-producing mechanism as a staged application of various dedicated operations. The present paper begins by presenting a bird eye's view of this mechanism. We then square the complexity by asking how speakers control multiple access in generating simple utterances such as a table and a chair. In particular, we address two issues. The ® rst one concerns dependency: Do temporally contiguous access procedures interact in any way, or do they run in modular fashion? The second issue concerns temporal alignment: How much temporal overlap of processing does the system tolerate in accessing multiple content words, such as table and chair? Results from picture± word interference and eye tracking experiments provide evidence for restricted cases of dependency as well as for constraints on the temporal alignment of access procedures.
Linguists, neurologists, and the occasional psychologist began studying this skill over a century ago, but the systematic analysis of word production is only three decades old. Two initially quite unrelated approaches put the production of words again on the research agenda in psycholinguistics: word production chronometry and speech error analysis.
Two classical insights arose from the chronometric tradition. The ® rst one is that semantically related words compete for production, which is saliently the case in the famous Stroop task, and convincingly demonstrate d by way of picture/word interference experiments (Lupker, 1979; Rosinski, Michnick GolinkoOE , & Kukish, 1975) . The paradigm here is to present a picture to be named and to measure the speech onset latency. Simultaneously with the picture, or somewhat earlier or later (at diOE erent stimulus onset asynchronies, SOAs), a distractor stimulus is presented, which the subject should try to ignore. It can be a word that is in some way related to the picture, or an unrelated word. It can be a visual stimulus appearing in the picture, or an auditory stimulus. When you present a competing, semantically related distractor, such as cow when the target picture presents a dog, you get inhibition, that is slower naming (as compared to presenting an unrelated distractor word, such as stone). The second classical insight is that the speed of accessing words for production is frequency dependent. A much-used word, usually one that has been acquired early in life, is produced faster than a low-frequency word (Old® eld & Wing® eld, 1965) . John Morton (1969) combined these two insights in the very ® rst chronometric model of lexical access: his Logogen theory.
The existence of semantic competition was also apparent from the speech error tradition. Word substitution errors, such as``don' t burn your toes'' (intended: ® ngersÐ from Garrett, 1975) , are mostly semantic in nature (Meringer & Mayer, 1895 /1978 Fromkin, 1973) . Another contribution, where speech error analysis was far ahead of the chronometric tradition, was the demonstration that words are not produced as indivisible wholes, but composed segment by segment, as appears from phonological speech errors such as Yew Nork for New York, in which single segments exchange position. Stephany Shattuck-Hufnage l (1979) accounted for these data in the ® rst theory of phonological word encoding: the scan-copier model. The con¯uence of these two approaches (see Levelt, 1999 for more detail) has led to rather sophisticated theories of word production, of which we will presently review one in some more detail.
However, words usually don't come alone. We skilfully combine them in the act of speaking, at rates of some two to three per second. What happens if we produce two, or a few words in close temporal contiguity? Do we simply concatenate the access procedures for each of the words, ® nishing one before starting the next? Or do these procedures overlap in ways to be discovered? To make these issues more precise, we need some of the details of our theory of lexical access.
SINGLE WORD ACCESS
A review of our theory, its computational implementation, and empirical support are available as a BBS target paper . The theory has two features that are particularly relevant for the present purpose. The ® rst one is the staged character of lexical access (Figure 1) , the second one is its realisation through spreading activation (Figure 2 ).
Conceptual preparation
Producing words is a staged process. Take the verb defend as an example. Imagine a city under siege and its pugnacious general declaring: We'll defend it. The very ® rst stage of preparing this utterance is to decide what notion to express. Would it be clearer, or more appropriate for the general, to present his state of mind in terms of the notion DEFEND, or Figure 1 . Stages of lexical access in spoken word production.
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rather PROTECT or PRESERVE? That depends on the strategic circumstances, in particular the condition of the addressee. Such ruminations are called``perspective taking'' . Let us assume the general opts for the notion of defending. It is, then, the target concept. It is also a lexical concept, because the general has a word for it in his language, which happens to be English. Figure 2 shows the general's active concept DEFEND in the network model (called WEAVER, Roelofs, 1992 Roelofs, , 1997 . From lexical decision experiments (Levelt et al., 1991) we know that, at least during picture naming, semantically related concepts are co-activated. For DEFEND they might be PROTECT and PRESERVE. This completes the ® rst stage in Figure 1 , conceptual preparation.
Lexical selection
During the next stage, lexical selection, the general selects from his mental lexicon a word that corresponds to his target concept. There is precisely one word in the lexicon that ® ts it, the word defend. Actually, the general doesn't immediately retrieve the whole word; initially only the word' s syntax becomes available plus a pointer to the word form. That bit of information is called the``lemma''. The corresponding node, the lemma for defend, is depicted in the lemma stratum of Figure 2 . It speci® es that it is a verb, a transitive one. The lemma also has variable options for tense, number, and person features, which are set during grammatical encoding. Now remember that the general had a few alternative concepts in mind, among them PROTECT and PRESERVE. They have been sending activation to their lemmas, hence these lemmas are now in competition with defend. In WEAVER, classical word competition is competition among lemmas. Competition is a main determinant of selection latency. Roelofs (1992) de® nes the probability of selecting the target lemma during any unit time interval by Luce's (1959) ratio: the activation of the target lemma divided by the summed activation of all lemmas. This rule made it possible to predict response latencies for a large variety of picture/word interference conditions, predictions that were well met by the experimental data Roelofs, 1992 Roelofs, , 1993 . The selection of the target lemma, the transitive in® nitive verb defend, completes this second stage of the general's lexical access, lexical selection.
Morpho-phonological encoding
During the subsequent stage, morpho-phonologica l encoding, the general's job becomes a very diOE erent one. Up to this point, he had to deal with a whole army of active, competing words. From now on he has only one target left: to prepare the articulation of a single word,``defend'', in its context. This begins by retrieving the word form, that is the phonological code to which the selected lemma points. There is good evidence now that a word' s lemma is accessed before its phonological code is retrieved. One of several relevant studies is by van Turennout, Hagoort, and Brown (1998) , which shows that accessing a word' s syntactic gender in picture naming precedes accessing its phonological code by about 40 ms.
Our general will retrieve the phonological code of defend, depicted at the word form stratum of Figure 2 . It largely consists of the word's phonological segments: /d/, /i/, /f/, / /, /n/, and /d/, an ordered set. Picture/word interference experiments (among others have made it most likely that these segments are simultaneously activated. Still, phonological codes come in successive packages. You retrieve them per morpheme. For instance, we have as yet unpublished experimental evidence showing that when you access a multimorphemic word, such as doorstep, you ® rst retrieve the code for door and then the code for step. Sequentiality may also hold for stems and in¯ections. If the general decides to say we will be defending the city, the progressive tense feature of the lemma defend causes the code for defend and the code for the in¯ection ing (see Figure 2) to be successively selected.
Accessing the word' s or morpheme's phonological code is frequency dependent. When you have two diOE erent, but homophonic words, such as skate, the ice skate, and skate, the ® sh, you get frequency summation, as Jescheniak and Levelt (1994) have shown. In other words, the lowfrequency word skate-the-® sh is accessed just as fast as the high-frequency word skate-the-ice-skate. Accessing the phonological code can be a major problem for anomic patients, and, occasionally, for all of us, namely when we slip into a tip-of-the-tongue state.
Let us return to our general. Upon retrieving the phonological code of his target word defend, the general can start the real work of phonological encoding. The core business of encoding a phonological word is syllabi® -cation. Syllables are the units of articulation and the general will have to prepare the syllable structure of his utterance, we'll defend it. Let us consider the part defend it. According to our theory of phonological encoding, the general will encode the syllables incrementally, one by one. The general takes the ® rst segment, /d/, and keeps adding segments till he has a ® rst syllable. That is quickly done, /d/ and /i/ form a syllable, /di/, according to the phonology of English. Then the general starts building the next syllable by successively chaining the segments /f/, / /, and /n/ /dIt/. Notice that this syllable straddles the lexical boundary between defend and it; the general doesn't say defend-it, but defen-dit. A word' s syllabi® cation is therefore not ® xed. Whether /f nd/ or rather /f n/ will be a syllable of defend depends on the word that follows. It is, therefore, unlikely that a word' s parsing into syllables is stored in our mental lexicon. It is, rather, created on the¯y, dependent on the context in which the word appears. There is convincing experimental evidence that syllabi® cation is indeed an incremental process, running from the beginning to the end of words (Meyer, 1990 (Meyer, , 1991 .
Phonetic encoding
Let us now turn to the next stage, phonetic encoding. As successive syllables are created, the general quickly turns them into the speci® cation of successive articulatory targets. The targets for a syllable are called the syllable's articulatory score. How is this score computed? We don't know, but one notion that we have been pursuing is a claim, ® rst put forward by Crompton (1982) , that such articulatory syllable scores are stored. The repository of syllabic scores has been called the speaker' s mental syllabary (Levelt & Wheeldon, 1994) . There are various reasons why such a notion is attractive. Crompton argued from speech errors. You can also argue from statistical evidence. We do some 80 per cent of our talking with no more than 500 diOE erent syllables . Applying this to the previous word count, we can estimate that on reaching adulthood, we have on average produced each of these syllables some 200,000 times, or 30 times every single day. Syllables are among the most exercised motor patterns we produce. It is precisely such high-frequent, overlearned motor patterns that, according to Rizzolatti and Gentilluci (1988) , get stored in the premotor cortex.
The syllabary notion has been incorporated in the WEAVER model (Roelofs, 1997) . The idea is that during phonological encoding, each phonological segment spreads activation to all syllable scores in which it partakes (see Figure 2 ). The speed of retrieving a syllable's articulatory score is, again, determined by Luce's ratio. At this moment, the chronometric evidence in support of this model is still incomplete.
Articulation
The ® nal move of our general is to loudly articulate what he has been composing. The general will, at some moment, begin to execute the speech movements corresponding to the articulatory scores. We will refrain from discussing the physiology and mechanics of articulation. The one relevant issue for our present purpose is this: At what stage in the process is the general to initiate his articulation? There are various possibilities here. The general's utterance consists of four syllables: we'll-de-fendit. The most diligent way would be for the general to begin articulation right after the phonetic encoding of the ® rst syllable [we'll] . The other extreme is that the general will wait till the whole utterance has been planned. Recent research by Bachoud-LeÂ vi, Dupoux, Cohen, and Mehler (1998) and by Schriefers and Teruel (1999) suggests that articulation can be initiated as soon as the ® rst syllable has been phonetically encoded.
Self-monitoring
One ® nal remark on the theory: As the general is preparing and articulating his utterance, he is also monitoring his own production. He can obviously listen to his own overt speech, but also monitor some aspect of`i nner speech'' , probably the syllabi® ed phonological code that he composed incrementally (Wheeldon & Levelt, 1994) . This monitoring system has been called``the internal monitoring loop' ' (Levelt, 1983) . So far for our bird' s eye view of the lexical access theory. It su ces for approaching some issues of multiple access.
MULTIPLE WORD ACCESS
The issue of multiple access is now easily posed. When you produce an utterance such as the baby and the dog, you access two diOE erent content words, baby and dog. For each of them you must run through the stages we just considered. There are now two essential questions to be asked (see Figure 3) . First, will the two processes interact or will they both run in modular fashion? In particular, will the initiation of articulation of the ® rst word be dependent on any aspect of accessing the second word? We will call this the issue of dependency. Second, dependency or no dependency, how will the stages of the two access procedures be temporally aligned? The two extreme possibilities are: they run fully in parallel (except, of course, for the words' articulation), or the ® rst accessing process is completed before the second one begins. This we will call the issue of temporal alignment.
These two issues have been studied in various contexts. We just mentioned the case of NP-coordination (the baby and the dog), but other cases that have received attention are adjective± noun constructions, Figure 3 . Two issues in multiple lexical access: Mutual dependency and temporal alignments of processing stages. subject± verb constructions, and, recently, idiomatic constructions. We will ® rst discuss the issue of dependency and then turn to the temporal alignment of stages.
DEPENDENCY
Adjective± noun phrases Schriefers (1993) was the ® rst to approach the issue of dependency. The crucial initial experiments were on noun phrase production. One central ® nding of these experiments concerned gender marking in the generation of adjective± noun phrases. There are two diOE erent genders in Dutch (neuter and non-neuter) that go with two diOE erent de® nite articles. If you produce a noun phrase like red chair without an article, then, in Dutch, you must mark the noun's gender on the adjective (rod stoel, where the schwa-ending on the adjective marks the non-neutral gender of the noun). It is therefore a matter of linguistic necessity to access the noun lemma, which includes gender information, in order to gender mark the adjective. In other words, the dependency goes from the noun's to the article's lemma parameters Ð gender parameters in this case. Herbert Schriefers tested this dependency in a picture/word interference experiment. Subjects named pictures, such as a picture of a red chair, while trying to ignore an auditory distractor word. That word could be gender congruent or gender incongruent to the target word. Gender mismatch of target and distractor noun resulted in signi® cantly longer naming latencies when the stimulus onset asynchrony was zero. This is the ® rst well-established case of dependency. Setting the features for lemma 1 (the adjective) depends on retrieving features of lemma 2 (the noun) which was apparently delayed by the presentation of a mismatching distractor. The reason for this dependency is syntactic. It is a requirement of Dutch grammatical encoding.
Could it be the case that the Dutch speakers went as far as phonological encoding of the noun before turning to accessing the adjective? That would predict a latency eOE ect of a distractor that is phonologically related to the noun. However, in spite of much testing, Schriefers and colleagues never found an eOE ect of phonological noun primes on the production of adjective± noun phrases. Hence, in this case dependency seems to be limited to the lemma level.
Idiomatic expressions
A rather diOE erent case of dependency arises in the production of idioms. Recent experiments by Sprenger, Levelt, and Kempen (1999) addressed W ORD FOR W ORD the issue of how speakers access ® xed expressions, such as to skate on thin ice. Fixed expressions, among them idioms, abound in our vernacular language. Rough estimates indicate that we know as many ® xed expressions as single words. A theory of lexical access if not complete till we understand the mental storage and generation of ® xed expressions. It is, therefore, a theoretical challenge to extend the WEAVER network theory of lexical access to include idioms. Take the example of to skate on thin ice. How is this idiom represented? The theoretical proposal is depicted in Figure 4 . A ® rst assumption is that the idiom relates to a speci® c concept, roughly meaning``to take great risks' '. It is a concept like any lexical concept. The only diOE erence is that we have an expression for it in our language, not a single word. The second assumption is that you access the expression through a``superlemma' '. It represents the idiom' s restricted syntax and points to a set of simple lemmas, among them skate, thin, and ice in the example. Selecting the superlemma is like selecting any other lemma. It is in competition with semantically related lemmas, such as risk or gamble; the chronometry of its selection is determined by Luce's ratio. Upon selection of the superlemma, the simple lemmas it points to, such as skate, thin, and ice, are selected. This selection process is special in that the superlemma can impose restrictions on the syntactic potential of the composing lemmas. For instance, ice is not allowed to take any other adjective than just thin (this can be formally realised by means of a co-indexing device).
The third assumption is that, from here on, grammatical and phonological encoding proceed standardly: The selected lemmas combine into phrases, their phonological codes are retrieved, followed by syllabi® cation, and so on.
Fixed expressions present a curious instance of multiple access. It is no longer the case that each simple lemma is triggered by its own lexical concept. Rather, multiple lemmas are selected in concert, triggered by the idiomatic superlemma. Is this a plausible story? The theory leads to a host of predictions, of which we will mention two. First, idioms should be produced at longer latencies than corresponding non-idiomatic expressions. Compare skating on thin ice and skating on smooth ice. In the idiomatic case, lemma selection is a two-step aOE air. You ® rst select the superlemma and then the simple lemmas. In the non-idiomatic or literal case, lemma selection is a one-step procedure, not involving the extra level of superlemmas.
A second prediction is that identity priming will be more eOE ective for idioms than for non-idiomatic constructions. Imagine the following experimental situation. The subject learns a set of prompt-phras e pairs, among them RISKÐ to skate on thin ice or rather WINTERÐ to skate on smooth ice. Then, in the production task, you present the subject with the cue on the screen, for instance the word RISK, and the subject responds with the utterance to skate on thin ice; the speech onset latency is measured. What will be the eOE ect of presenting the subject with an auditory identity prime, for instance skate during the execution of this task? The subject sees RISK on the screen and simultaneously hears skate. In the model this auditory identity prime will trigger activation of the lemma skate, which in turn will activate the superlemma of the idiom, which in turn will activate all other lemmas in the idiom, speeding up their selection, given Luce's rule. If you trigger the lemma skate in a nonidiomatic expression, such as to skate on smooth ice, no such chain eOE ect will result. You activate just one of the lemmas. Hence one should expect a stronger priming eOE ect for idioms. Sprenger et al. (1999) tested these two predictions in an experiment of the type just described. The Dutch idioms were roughly of the type to skate on thin ice and they were matched with non-idiomati c phrases, such as to skate on smooth ice. The identity prime was the same in the two cases, skate in the example. As a control, there was also an unrelated prime (such as cat or house). In a further experiment, Sprenger et al. used phonological primes, such as scale for skate. Given the theory, a phonological prime should not aOE ect idioms and non-idioms in diOE erent ways; one should ® nd only that idioms are slower than non-idioms and that phonological priming facilitates the production of both utterance types. The experiments con® rmed all predictions. First, idioms are signi® cantly slower to be initiated than non-idioms, for both kinds of prime. Second, identity primes are more eOE ective for idioms than for non-idioms Ð we have a signi® cant interaction here. Third, no such interaction arises for phonological primes; they are neither facilitative for idioms nor for nonidioms. These results support the theoretical account, which is that producing idioms involves a particular type of dependency in selecting the composing lemmas; they are selected in joint dependence on the selection of a superlemma.
Expressions containing multiple noun phrases
A third and ® nal case of dependency has been reported by Meyer (1996) . Subjects described pictures of two objects, such as a baby and a dog, by a coordination of two de® nite noun phrases: the baby and the dog, orÐ in another experimentÐ by a locative sentence: the baby is next to the dog. The results were the same for these two cases and we will combine them here. The experiments were again of the picture± word interference type. Presentation of the picture was combined with auditory presentation of a distractor word, whose onset could be simultaneous with picture onset or 150 ms earlier. The distractor could be semantically related to either the ® rst or the second content word (for instance childÐ related to baby, or cowÐ related to dog). Alternatively, there could be an unrelated control distractor, such as pipe. As discussed earlier, semantic distractors can have an inhibitory eOE ect in single object naming. In the WEAVER model this eOE ect is caused at the level of lemma selection. Figure 5 (a) presents a summary of the experimental data, ignoring the SOAs. Both semantic distractors produced highly signi® cant interference, that is, there was interference with both the ® rst and the second lemma. In other words, in these experiments speakers make the initiation of their utterance dependent on having accessed both the ® rst and the second lemma.
Or is it rather the case that they make it dependent on the encoding of both word forms? Of course, the ® rst word form must be encoded before the initiation of speech, but what about the second one? To test this, the semantic distractors were replaced by phonological ones, for instance babel for baby and doll for dog. These primes were presented at four diOE erent SOAs. It has been repeatedly shown that such primes speed up access to the phonological codes, relative to phonologically unrelated primes (see Levelt et al., 1999 for a review). Figure 5 (b) presents the results, averaged over utterance types and SOAs. The initiation of articulation was faster when the ® rst content word (baby) was phonologically primed, but priming the second content word (dog) was without eOE ect. Hence the dependency is one of accessing the second lemma only, not its word form. DiOE erent from the gender case discussed previously, there is no reason to suppose that accessing the ® rst lemma is made dependent on accessing the second one; there is no syntactic reason for doing so. It is Figure 5 . Naming latency effects of semantic (a) and phonological (b) distractors in double object naming.
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either the phonological or phonetic encoding of the ® rst content word, or even just the initiation of articulation that waits for the second lemma to be available.
Why would a speaker do so? In all of these experiments, but also in many real-life situations, a speaker is under two pressures. One is to respond fast, the other is to respond¯uently, that is without hesitations or interruptions. It serves speed to begin articulation as soon as the ® rst content word has been phonetically encoded. It serves¯uency to check whether the crucial second lemma has been selected; that guarantee s diligent phonological encoding of the second noun phrase while you are articulating the ® rst one. This type of¯uency-motivated dependency seems to be strategic in nature. In fact, in some subsequent experiments no semantic priming eOE ect was obtained for the second noun, even when the description was as simple as the baby and the dog (Meyer, 1997) . Subjects apparently often value speed more than¯uency. We will return to that issue.
Conclusion
Cases of dependency are relatively rare. First, there are no known cases of phonological dependency, that is the initiation of articulation waiting for the phonological encoding of a later content word. Second, there are cases of lemma dependency: The initiation of articulation depends on the retrieval of two or multiple lemmas. This is necessarily the case in Dutch adjective± noun constructions, where gender marking of the adjective depends on the gender of the noun lemma. It is, apparently, also the case in the encoding of idioms; a superlemma theory of idiom access can explain this. Third, there are strategic cases where speakers hold the initiation of articulation till they have evidence that one or more later lemmas have been retrieved. This is, probably, a safeguard for¯uency of delivery.
TEMPORAL ALIGNMENT
Clearly, there must be temporal alignment when there is dependency, and we discussed a few such cases. But if two or more processes of lexical access run independently, they may still overlap in time. This would, in fact, serve¯uency. If we encoded each next word from scratch after completing the current word' s articulation, our speech would get disconnected. This is prevented when successive access operations are telescoped to some degree. How much telescoping is done?
Eye tracking
Recently, we have been pursuing this issue by means of an eye tracking set-up. When subjects describe a scene like the one in Figure 6 (a), they almost always focus the objects in left-to-right order and this is also the order of mention (the scooter and the ball). An important dependent variable in this project is viewing time. It is the duration of looking at an object. That interval begins with the ® rst ® xation on the object; it ends when the saccade to the other object is made. The other dependent variable is, of course, speech onset latency.
Out initial conception of how speakers align access procedures here was that they would attend to the left object (the scooter in Figure 6a ), just long enough to recognise it. This should su ce to trigger all further encoding operations for the phrase the scooter. They could then shift attention to the second object (the ball in the example scene) in order to recognise it. This would allow the linguistic encoding procedures for the two noun phrases to overlap maximally, such serving¯uency. In other words, we applied the principle of incrementality, which has been used so pro® tably in modelling speech production.
The subjects' gaze patterns can be revealing in this matter. When the subject shifts gaze from the ® rst to the second object, we can be sure the subject shifts attention to that object. So, when will the gaze be shifted? On our initial conception, viewing time on the left object would be just long enough to do object recognition. This would be in agreement with current human performance theory. Sanders (1998) , in his comprehensive treatment of human performance theory, discusses the two-object scanning case in great depth. His conclusion from the experimental evidence is that the saccade out of the left-hand object is triggered when the perceptual stage has been completed. The viewing time is uncontaminated by response selection. It is, therefore, a challenge to test whether, in our two-object naming case, the left object viewing time is aOE ected by perceptual factors (it should) and by``response selection' ' factors (it should not). Meyer, Sleiderink, and Levelt (1998) used contour deletion (see Figure  6b) as a perceptual factor. It should take longer to recognise the object in the degraded case; hence viewing time should be longer. How to aOE ect`r esponse selection''? We decided to use word frequency as an independent variable. As discussed earlier, accessing a word' s phonological code (i.e., the``response code' ') is faster for high-frequency words than for low-frequency ones. Hence, pictures were chosen that had either high-or low-frequency names. (We determined for our experimental pictures that the time needed to recognise them was uncorrelated with word frequency; this was done in a pre-experiment where subjects made object/non-object decisions). Viewing times should not be aOE ected by word frequency.
The data told us otherwise. As predicted, viewing times were signi® -cantly longer for degraded pictures than for full ones, by 15 ms. However, viewing times were also dependent on word frequency. Viewing times were, on average, 34 ms longer for pictures with low-frequency names than for pictures with high-frequency names. Hence, we had a genuine surprise. The subject apparently does not move out the gaze before at least the word's phonological code has been accessed. Our initial conception was wrong.
Before giving in, however, we tested the issue once more in a diOE erent manner. There is another way to aOE ect the duration of phonological encoding, as we have seen, namely by presenting the subject with an auditory phonological prime. So, for instance, when the subject describes a scene by the utterance the book and the pipe, you can prime the phonological encoding of``book'' by giving either hook or boot as an auditory stimulus, as compared to an unrelated control stimulus, such as sail. The prime aOE ects selection of the phonological code for book. If the subject's gaze moves out before phonological encoding begins, viewing time should be insensitive to this type of auditory priming. But it is not. Meyer and van der Meulen (in press) report that, under auditory priming, viewing time on the left object is diminished by 50 ms on average. This recon® rms that the speaker' s attention stays on the ® rst object at least till the phonological code has been retrieved. Does it await just retrieval of the code, or rather completion of phonological encoding, in particular full syllabi® cation of the noun phrase? Earlier we mentioned that syllabi® cation is an incremental process. The more syllables there are to be encoded, the longer it takes. Is viewing time dependent on the length of the referring expression prepared by the speaker? If so, the shift of attention not only awaits accessing the phonological code, but the full completion of phonological encoding. In order to test this, we had scenes such as the one in Figure 6 (c) be described in one of two ways. The subject was either instructed to say the scooter and the ball or to say the big red scooter and the ball. Hence, the ® rst noun phrase is either simple and short or complex and long. In the Dutch equivalent we used, they diOE er by four syllables. In this case, the left object viewing times turned out to be hugely diOE erent; 559 ms for the simple utterance, 1229 ms for the complex utterance Ð a diOE erence of 670 ms. Still, the diOE erence in speech onset time was small and non-signi® cant (713 ms for the simple utterance, 755 for the complex one). It is apparently not the case that speech onset triggers the saccade to the second object. The saccade is triggered 154 ms before speech onset for the simple utterance, but as much as 474 ms after speech onset for the complex utterance. Our best guess is that the gaze shift is triggered by the completion of the phonological encoding, i.e., the syllabi® cation of the referential phrase, the scooter or the big red scooter. That would predict that, measured from the saccade to the right object, the latency of initiating the second phrase (and the ball) should be the same in the simple and complex cases, and our estimates suggest that it is: about 580 ms in both cases.
These results show that, diOE erent from what we expected and from what human performance theory suggests, the time course of double lexical access is not maximally telescoped. The encoding of referent 2 begins only after the phonological encoding of reference 1 has been completed. It may even be the case that temporal overlap is not maximised, but rather minimised. Under the conditions of the present experiments, a still later gaze shift would probably have created speech dys¯uencies. After the gaze shift the subjects had, on average, no more than 584 ms to go before¯uently initiating the second phrase (and the ball) , that is about 700 ms before initiating the noun phrase the ball. Remember that, for the simple utterance, the subjects needed 713 ms from seeing the left object to initiating the ® rst noun phrase, the scooter. Hence, some 700 ms were probably needed for planning the second noun phrase (the ball) as well. In other words, a still later saccade to the right object would have led to dys¯uency.
CONCLUSION
It is fair to say that we found less evidence for dependency and less evidence for temporal overlap than we had expected. Our speakers preferred to begin their access to the ® rst content word without having to bother about later content words. Systematic dependency occurred when grammatical features of the later word were relevant for the encoding of the current word, as is the case for gender congruency in Dutch adjectivenoun phrases. It also occurred when lemma retrieval of two (or more) words is jointly dependent on the selection of a single``superlemma' ' as is the case in producing an idiom. But without such linguistic ties between successive encoding operations, accessing the ® rst content word usually proceeded without regard to later lexical material.
What purpose can be served by this strategy of shifting attention as late as possible? The main function may well be to minimise processing load. Staggering same-kind processes often goes at the expense of buOE ering resources. This is apparently also the case for phonological encoding processes. By spreading them thin, we keep processing load at a comfortable level. What speakers apparently do tolerate in these experiments is temporal overlap of the articulation of one item with the encoding of a following one. That is in agreement with earlier ® ndings by Wheeldon and Levelt (1995) , where phonological encoding of a word was observed to proceed under concurrent articulation of another word.
Temporal overlap of successive lexical access procedures was minimised to the level of brinkmanship. Our speakers seemed to rather risk dys¯uency than having to cope with extra cognitive load or interference in the encoding of subsequent content words. Hence, one may paradoxically conclude that a speaker' s encoding of a subsequent lexical item is made highly dependent on completing the encoding of the current one. This context-dependenc y guarantees undisturbed,``modular'' execution of each subsequent access procedure.
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